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NOTES
THE LIMITATIONS ON VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF JURORS
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
One of the major phases of the criminal trial, one which may
be determinative of its ultimate result, is the voir dire examina-
tion of the jury panel. Voir dire, derived from a Latin phrase
literally meaning "to speak the truth,"' is the description used
to denote the examination to which prospective jurors are sub-
jected after being impaneled for the purpose of disclosing to
the parties litigant any particular beliefs, biases, or relationships
of the individual veniremen which might render them objection-
able as jurors.
This examination is usually conducted by counsel for each liti-
gant in criminal prosecutions in state courts. However, in the
federal courts questions are propounded to the jurors by the
presiding judge, after being submitted to him in writing by each
counsel. It is the purpose of this note to consider and evaluate the
limitations which various jurisdictions have placed upon the sub-
ject matter which may be included in such examinations in both
state and federal criminal prosecutions.
IN GENERAL
To clarify the nature of the limitations on voir dire examina-
tions, it is first necessary to consider the purpose for which such
interrogation is intended. The common belief is that a juror's
examination is permitted to enable counsel to discover any facts
or circumstances surrounding the juror which tend to show
prejudice, bias, or some other ground for disqualification and
challenge for cause. Although true, this is but half the story.
The voir dire examination also serves the much broader purpose
of allowing counsel to lay proper foundations in order that he
may intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges.2 It is this
purpose of which courts frequently lose sight when imposing
1. BLACK, LAW DIcTIoNARY 1822 (3rd ed. 1933).
2. Lightfoot v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 151, 219 S. W. 2d 984 (1949);
Young v. State, 41 Okla. Crim. Rep. 226, 271 Pac. 426 (1928); Lavin v.
People, 69 Ill. 303 (1873) ; ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 52 (1940).
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rigid limitations upon these examinations. The latter office of
voir dire was recognized by a Missouri court in an early decision,
State v. Mann,3 wherein the court stated:
... The accused is imprisoned and is brought from prison,
and there for the first time, possibly, meets the forty men
summoned as jurors in his case, and, if blindly to make his
peremptory challenge, may strike from the panel the very
men whom he would have wished to retain had he known
their antecedents. If such is the law, the right of peremp-
tory challenges may prove a snare, and, at best, is of no
earthly value to the accused.4
This seems indicative of the most desirable trend, for the numer-
ous challenges a criminal defendant is allowed would be of little
value could he not exact sufficient information from the prospec-
tive jurors to enable an intelligent exercise of such challenges.
The general rule governing voir dire examinations is that their
limitations are regulable at the discretion of the trial court.a
Appellate courts will therefore refuse to reverse on the ground
that the trial judge, in his exercise of discretion, excluded certain
questions unless a clear abuse of discretion can be shown.0 How-
ever, it is incumbent upon the trial courts to exercise this dis-
cretion in view of the purpose for which interrogation of the
panel is allowed; never should a question be prohibited if it either
tends to reveal a disqualifying characteristic of the venireman
or embodies a reasonable attempt on the part of the examining
attorney to obtain information necessary to enable him to exer-
cise his peremptory challenges intelligently.
Unfortunately many trial courts today still persist in enforc-
ing rigid regulations upon voir dire examinations, refusing to
allow interrogations other than the time-honored questions per-
taining to bias, prejudice, pre-formed opinions of guilt, et cetera.
An example illustrating this proposition is found in the ruling
of the Georgia trial court in the case of Subia v. State,7 in which
3. 83 Mo. 589 (1884).
4. Id. at 597.
5. Connors v. United States, 158 U. S. 408 (1895); State v. Turley, 87
Vt. 163, 88 Atl. 562 (1912); State v. Hoffman, 344 Mo. 94, 125 S. W. 2d
55 (1939r).
6. State v. Turley, 87 Vt. 163, 88 Atl. 562 (1912); Dyer v. State, 241
Ala. 679, 4 So. 2d 311 (1941) (appellate court refused to reverse trial
court's ruling because there was no obvious abuse of discretion, although
trial court contravened the spirt of an Alabama statute providing for
liberal voir dire interrogations.)
7. 46 Ga. App. 422, 167 S. E. 726 (1933).
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the defendant had previously been indicted by a grand jury.
During the voir dire examination defense counsel proposed to
inquire of each juror whether he was related to any of the grand
jurors who had returned such indictment. The trial court's re-
fusal to allow such interrogations was upheld on appeal, the court
asserting that there had been no abuse of discretion and that
such questioning was beyond judicial precedent. This decision
indicates a refusal by the court to take cognizance of the broader
purpose of the voir dire examination, whereby the parties are
permitted to acquaint themselves with the jurors' backgrounds
so that the peremptory challenges might be exercised with rea-
sonable intelligence. In this case, it seems not unreasonable for
the defendant to desire to eliminate from the panel any relatives
of the grand jurors. The return of the indictment indicated that
the grand jurors had doubted defendant's innocence. It would
only be human nature for them to discuss and relate the various
aspects of this case; therefore, some of their relatives were likely
to have experienced a previous taste of the case before entering
the court room as veniremen. The proposed question, being rea-
sonably related to defendant's interest in the case, was excluded
by a narrow and conservative exercise of discretion which in
many jurisdictions would be termed an abuse for which reversal
may be granted.
The more desirable result involving a similar type of inter-
rogation is presented by a recent Kentucky decision, Lightfoot v.
Commonwealth,8 in which the ruling of the trial court was re-
versed because of an abuse of discretion. The question proposed
on the voir dire examination was whether any of the jurors or
members of their families held, or were employed in, any of the
county's political offices. The trial court's refusal to allow such
interrogation was reversed, the Supreme Court holding that a
litigant may ask prospective jurors about any matter which
might throw light on their background, so that he might better
exercise his discretion in making peremptory challenges. Al-
though the court deciding Subia v. State might well have sus-
tained the exclusion of this inquiry on the ground of lack of
precedent, the Kentucky court presents the more favorable opin-
ion which allows the defendant an opportunity to form a logical
basis for striking jurors from the panel.
8. 310 Ky. 151, 219 S. W. 2d 984 (1949).
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Of course counsel may frequently attempt an examination
which exceeds all propriety and which is wholly inconsistent with
the system of jury selection. An example of this type of ques-
tioning was presented in People v. Redola,9 wherein defendant's
counsel asked each juror whether he could start out on the case
believing defendant to be innocent. Such an inquiry was prop-
erly held to be error by the court on appeal, for no litigant has a
right to limit the jury to twelve jurors all possessing a present
belief that the defendant is innocent. In fact, such a belief might
well be the basis of a challenge for cause by the state, because the
juror has a pre-formed opinion concerning defendant's culpa-
bility. ° In view of this consideration, the exclusion of this type
of questioning was appropriate.11
However, in spite of the fact that the limitations on the voir
dire examination are generally a matter of discretion, there are
three general categories of questions concerning which virtually
every jurisdiction has established some definite policy. They are:
(1) questions as to membership in or prejudice against various
religious or political groups; (2) hypothetical questions intended
to elicit opinions of jurors; and (3) questions pertaining to the
law involved in the given case. It is in these three categories that
the law has crystallized to some degree regarding the scope of
questioning; hence it is incumbent upon practicing trial attor-
neys to acquaint themselves with the local policy appertaining
thereto.
QUESTIONS INVOLVING MEMBERSHIP IN VARIOUS GROUPS
AND PREJUDICES CONCERNING SUCH GROUPS
Today, one of the most uniform policies pertaining to voir dire
examinations concerns the permissibility of examining jurors as
9. 300 Ill. 392, 133 N. E. 292 (1921).
10. This is not to be confused with interrogations of the jury in regard
to the pres-umption of innocence, to which a defendant is entitled. Indeed a
presumption of innocence is vastly different from a pre-conceived belief of
innocence. The former will subsequently be considered herein. At any rate,
the examination attempted here was improper as it embodied an effort by
defendant to select jurors of a certain belief, whereas defendant's only right
is to r eject jurors. State v. Cady, 80 Me. 413, 14 Atl. 940 (1888).
11. A decision of somewhat greater doubt is that of Kelley v. State, 51
Okla. Crim. Rep. 249, 300 Pac. 436 (1931), where the trial court denied
counsel the right to ask jurors what their verdict had been in previous
criminal cases in which they sat. Is it not possible that, despite the ad-
mitted irrelevancy of the fact, defendant sought to exclude jurors who had
previously convicted men on similar charges? Should then this question
not be permitted?
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to their membership in various groups, be they political, fra-
ternal, religious or otherwise. In an era of multifarious "do-
good" organizations, courts of the present time recognize the
prejudices likely to be inculcated in the minds of members of
these various movements. In general, it will be observed that
our modern criminal courts permit a reasonable examination of
prospective jurors as to their affiliation with such groups and
also allow point-blank interrogation of each juror as to any prej-
udices he might harbor against any particular race, religion, or
nationality. 12
This general problem confronted the United States Supreme
Court in 1895, in Connors v. United States.13 The defendant was
charged with theft of certain ballot boxes from election judges
in Colorado. Defense counsel proposed to inquire of each juror
whether or not he was politically active in that 1890 election, and
to which, if any, political party he adhered. Obviously, the entire
case involved a political scandal, and defense counsel desired to
reject all jurors whose political sentiments were contrary to
those interests for which defendant had acted. The trial court,
however, prohibited all inquiries as to political affiliations, this
ruling being affirmed by the Supreme Court, which commented:
If an inquiry of a juror as to his political opinions and asso-
ciations could ever be appropriate in any case arising under
the statute in question, it could only be when it is made
otherwise to appear that the particular juror has himself,
by his conduct or declarations, given reason to believe that
he will regard the case as one involving the interests of
political parties.14
Apparently the court here considered only the primary purpose
of a voir dire examination, completely neglecting the fact that
such examination must also serve as a foundation for' peremptory
challenges.
The decision in the Connors case, however, has long been out-
dated. Today, the majority view is decidedly to the contrary. As
a recent illustration, the California Supreme Court decision of
People v. Buyle"5 may be considered. This case involved a bur-
12. People v. Becker, 22 Cal. App. 2d. 143, 70 P. 2d. 955 (1948);
Young v. State, 41 Okla. Crhn. Rep. 226, 271 Pac. 426 (1928); Bethel v.
State, 162 Ark. 76, 257 S. W. 740 (1940); State v. Tighe, 27 Mont. 327,
71 Pac. 3 (1903).
13. 158 U. S. 408 (1895).
14. Id. at 413.
15. 22 Cal. App. 2d 143, 70 P. 2d 955 (1948).
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glary prosecution, the entire situation being one of a series of
events arising out of an industrial dispute and union strikes.
Because union disputes were involved and because Communists
are generally known to possess radical opinions regarding labor
strife, the trial court permitted defense counsel to ask each indi-
vidual juror whether he or she was a Communist. Furthermore,
this ruling was affirmed on appeal, the California court aptly
asserting:
In order to ascertain whether a juror is prejudiced in a
given case it has always been held proper to inquire as to his
membership in any political, religious, social, industrial, fra-
ternal, law-enforcement, or other organization whose beliefs
or teaching would prejudice him for or against either party
to the case. 6
With few exceptions, this excerpt restates the law of today, the
political affiliations of jurors now being a legitimate subject of
interrogation wherever politics are in some manner involved in
the case.' 7
Another typical species of questioning which now has almost
universal approval of the trial .courts is an interrogation of the
jurors as to prejudices which they might harbor against certain
racial or religious groups. The most common situation for such
examination occurs when the defendant is a Negro and his attor-
ney desires to question the panel in regard to race prejudice.
Aldridge v. United States"8 involved just such circumstances, de-
fendant being a Negro on trial in the District of Columbia for
murder of a white man. The trial court, convicting defendant,
had refused to allow his attorney to ask each juror whether he
retained any prejudice against Negroes. The United States Su-
preme Court reversed this ruling and held that in this specific
instance such questioning was both reasonable and permissive.
The court then attempted to formulate a general rule to govern
voir dire interrogations for the purpose of eliciting prejudices
and decided that the determining factor of whether or not a ques-
16. Id. at 146, 70 P. 2d at 957.
17. The rule is not as settled in regard to voir dire examinations by
prosecuting attorneys. The courts are generally more rigid in limiting
them, in comparison with defendants' interrogations. See Gurley v. State,
164 Ark. 397, 262 S. W. 636 (1924), where defendant was a public officer on
trial for embezzlement, and the court would not allow the prosecution to
ask jurors whether they were politically sympathetic with defendant's party
superior.
18. 283 U. S. 308 (1931).
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tion regarding racial, religious, or political prejudice should be
allowed is the remoteness of the possibility of the existence of
such prejudices. Where there is any probability of the presence
of racial bias in the jurors' minds, an examination to discover it
shall be allowed on voir dire. Similar rules had previously been
adopted in most state courts,19 the test always being one of re-
moteness: when the existence of prejudice is likely the interroga-
tion of jurors pertaining thereto is permissible.
However, the permissibility of inquiring into jurors' preju-
dices is not to be confused with interrogations as to whether
jurors will give appropriate credence to testimony of members
of such races or groups. For example, a juror may be asked,
"Are you prejudiced against Negroes?", but it would be outside
the scope of voir dire to ask him, "Would you give equal credence
to the testimony of a Negro as to that of a white man, other
things being equal?" The former is a permissible question, as
previously explained, but the latter is absolutely forbidden as it
seeks to cause the jurors to determine a witness' credibility be-
fore he takes the stand. In effect, such a question is an attempt
to elicit an opinion from a juror as to how he might react to
certain situations which may arise later in the trial. Questions
having such an effect are not allowable, as will be subsequently
explained2( Suffice it to say that if it is desired to examine a
panel to discover any hidden prejudices, the questions should be
framed as direct inquiries to the jurors, but should never be
asked in a hypothetical form, asking a juror how he might con-
sider subsequent testimony from a person of a certain race or
group.
Frequently, for various reasons, counsel may desire to deter-
mine whether veniremen are members of certain religious or
secret fraternal groups. Generally, courts today will permit such
questioning under proper circumstances. In an Arkansas case,
Bethel v. State,-1 the defendant's attorney desired to interrogate
jurors as to membership in the Ku Klux Klan, which organiza-
tion had conducted a secret investigation of this case previously.
Although the trial court refused to allow the examination, the
19. State v. Munch, 57 Mo. App. 207 (1894) ; People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347
(1855); People v. Christie, 2 Park. Crin. Rep. 579, 2 Abb. Pr. 256 (N. Y.
1855) (questions regarding prejudices against Catholics).
20. See "Hypothetical Questions to Elicit Jurors' Opinions," infra.
21. 162 Ark. 76, 257 S. W. 740 (1924).
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Arkansas Supreme Court, in reversing, held that the question
as to Ku Klux Klan membership was here permissible. An ac-
cused has the right, the court stated, to inquire as to the mem-
bership of prospective jurors in any organization whenever it is
shown that such membership may influence the parties to the
litigation in the exercise of peremptory challenges.2 2 Here, then,
is a true recognition of the usefulness of a voir dire examina-
tion; the parties should be entitled to exact whatever information
might reasonably influence their challenges. The text seems to
be one of good faith. The party examining the jury need not
introduce proof that such organization (with which the question
was concerned) is actually antagonistic to defendant. As long
as the court feels that the interrogation is a bona fide attempt
to obtain information upon which to base peremptory challenges,
the questioning as to affiliation with certain organizations should
be permitted.23
Of course, where the organization with which the examination
concerns itself has no reasonable connection with the facts of
the case, or the person of the defendant, the interrogation is not
permissible. Thus, in a case where defendant was a woman on
trial for murder, the jurors could not be asked whether they
belonged to the Ku Klux Klan on the dubious reasoning that such
organization was composed of men only.24 In the absence of any
manifestation that the organization inquired about is antago-
nistic to the accused or to some organizatoin of which the accused
is a member, such inquiries should not be tolerated.
In general, the same limitations would also apply to inquiries
as to jurors' religious affiliations. Where there is a reasonable
probability that members of a certain religious body may be
prejudiced, counsel will be permitted to inquire as to the jurors'
association with that religion. For example, in an early Utah
bigamy case, the prosecution was permitted to discover by ex-
amination whether any members of the panel were Mormons,
22. Id. at 84, 257 S. W. at 743.
23. Bethel v. State, 162 Ark. 76, 257 S. W. 740 (1924); Reich v. State,
94 Tex. Crim. Rep. 449, 251 S. W. 1072 (1923); Clark v. State, 154 Ark.
592, 243 S. W. 868 (1922) ; State v. Tighe, 27 Mont. 327, 71 Pac. 3 (1903)
(murder trial, where defendant's counsel was permitted to ask jurors if
they belonged to the same lodge as deceased); State v. Mann, 83 Mo. 58D
(1884); Lavin v. People, 69 Il. 303 (1873) (trial for illicit liquor sale,
where jurors were questioned for membership in temperance societies).
24. Snyder v. State, 160 Ark. 93, 254 S. W. 381 (1923).
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since followers of that religion were known to be advocates of
polygamy.2
5
However, the wide latitude allowed in voir dire examinations
of jurors for membership in religious and fraternal organiza-
tions should be exploited with caution. Such inquiries might
result in prejudicial antagonism by a jury panel to counsel and
his client if it appeared to the jurors that counsel insisted on
prying into their religious and secret fraternal affiliations. Never
should discretion be sacrificed in the conduct of the examination.
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS TO ELICIT JURORS' OPINIONS
No type of interrogation in voir dire examinations is looked
upon with more disfavor by the courts than the hypothetical
question, posed to the jurors for the purpose of eliciting their
opinions on various matters and determining how they might
react should a certain situation arise in the course of the trial.
A typical question in this category would be, "Mr. Doe, if each
of the eleven other jurors absolutely believed the defendant
guilty, and you alone possessed a reasonable doubt as to guilt,
would you yield to the overwhelming odds ? ' '26 A careful analysis
of the nature of such an inquiry will immediately disclose the
reason for which virtually every court will refuse to allow it.
The question obviously does not embody a quest for information;
neither an affirmative nor a negative answer will present any
basis for a challenge for cause. Of course, it may be rationalized
that such a question was intended solely as a basis for exercising
peremptory challenges. However valid this argument might be,
courts nevertheless believe that the harm which may be wrought
by permitting such interrogations would by far outweigh any
service to the cause of justice resulting therefrom.
The chief objection is that such questions actually, if an-
swered, cause the jurors to commit themselves as to how they
will later decide a given issue. Thus, once allowed, there might
be no logical limit of the extent to which such examination could
be carried; it might even be extended to the absurd result of
permitting defense counsel to ask the panel whether they shall
find a verdict of not guilty if the defendant testifies under oath
25. United States v. Miles, 2 Utah 19 (1876).
26. This type of question was excluded from the voir dire examination
in State v. Tally, 22 S. W. 2d 787 (Mo. 1929).
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that he was innocent. Facetious as this example may be, it is of
the same type as other hypothetical questions which have been
proposed and excluded in voir dire examinations in nearly every
jurisdiction. An excellent summary of this general, almost unan-
imous, rule was stated by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v.
Pinkston:27
An attorney should not, in advance, ask a juror to speculate
upon what he would do, and how his verdict might be influ-
enced by certain contingencies that may later arise in the
trial.28
Certainly, in view of the desire to obtain a fair, unbiased, and
unintimidated jury in every criminal case, the justification for
this limitation cannot be questioned.
One of the most common applications of this limitation occurs
when counsel questions the jury as to how certain testimony will
be received by it. As previously pointed out, in a proper case it
may be permissible to question a juror as to racial or religious
prejudice.2 9 However, the question may never be framed hypo-
thetically, i. e., asking the juror whether he would give proper
credence to the testimony of a Negro"0 or a stranger,3 or by ask-
ing whether he would atach greater significance to the testimony
of a minister.32 In each case the object is the same: a juror cahnot
be required to commit himself in advance as to the weight which
he will accord certain testimony which is to be presented at the
trial. Were such questioning allowed, it would be a simple matter
for counsel to determine at the voir dire examination what testi-
mony would be most favorably received by that jury and to sift
out witnesses not likely to meet with the panel's approval. Such
a procedure would probably fail to bring about a just verdict on
the merits of the case.
As elementary as the rule against hypothetical questions ap-
pears to be, it is remarkable to observe the great number of
attempts by trial lawyers to make use of such interrogations,
all of which are immediately restrained by the courts. Questions
which may be bona fide attempts by counsel to acquaint himself
27. 336 Mo. 614, 79 S. W. 2d 1046 (1935).
28. Id. at 618, 79 S. W. 2d at 1048.
29. See "Questions Involving Membership in Various Groups and Preju-
dices Concerning Such Groups," supra.
30. State v. Scott, 198 La. 162, 3 So. 2d 545 (1941); State v. Dyer, 154
La. 379, 97 So. 563 (1923).
31. Denning v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. Rep. 153, 8 S. W. 2d 150 (1928).
32. State v. Holedger, 15 Wash. 443, 46 Pac. 652 (1896).
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with a juror's background are carelessly phrased so as to fall
within this prohibited category, and hence are excluded. For
example, in State v. Everitt,33 a trial involving a prosecution for
cattle stealing, the defendant desired to exercise the privilege of
testifying in his own defense. In such a case it would undoubt-
edly have been permissible for defendant's counsel to ask each
juror:
Are you prejudiced against defendant? Does the fact that
defendant has been indicted cause you to have any belief as
to his guilt, or does it make defendant any less reliable in
your eyes?
In this manner attorney could have quickly discovered which
jurors, if any, were prone to disregard as untruthful the testi-
mony which a criminal defendant gives in his own defense.
Instead, however, counsel in this case inquired of a juror:
If defendant exercises the privilege of testifying in his own
defense, could you give his testimony proper weight under
the circumstances ?34
This interrogation was promptly excluded by the court, and the
appellate court affirmed the decision. The question, as it was
phrased by counsel, was an improper attempt to pre-commit a
juror on a matter which he must subsequently decide. The same
information could easily have been exacted from the panel by
carefully wording the question.
A similar situation was presented in Denning v. State,3- a
prosecution for illegal sale of liquor, wherein counsel for de-
fendant, upon discovering that several of the jurors were on
friendly terms with the State's witnesses, improperly asked each
such juror whether he would give the same credence to a stran-
ger's testimony as to that of a friend. The court immediately
recognized this inquiry as being within the forbidden hypotheti-
cal category, hence refused to allow the jurors to answer. In
affirming this ruling, the appellate court pointed out the manner
in which the same information could have been obtained by a
more favorable and permissible examination, such as:
Would your acquaintance with the state's witnesses influence
your verdict? Would you prejudge the credibility of the
state's witnesses because of this friendship ?36
33. 14 Wash. 574, 47 Pac. 150 (1896).
34. Id. at 575, 47 Pac. at 150.
35. 110 Tex. Crim. Rep. 153, 8 S. W. 2d 150 (1928).
36. Id. at 154, 8 S. W. 2d at 150. Observe that this question is not
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In virtually every case, therefore, the rule against hypotheical
questions to elicit jurors' opinions should not prove much of a
hindrance to attorneys. A careful framing of the questions in
each case will enable counsel to obtain all the desired information
from the panel without transgressing the universal prohibition
against hypothetical questions. 7
Another common occasion upon which hypothetical questions
are frequently attempted is the first degree murder prosecution
in which jurors are questioned concerning their willingness to
impose capital punishment. Undoubtedly it is permissible, the
practice being quite common, to inquire of a juror whether or
not he opposes capital punishment and hence would not be able
conscientiously to recommend such penalty. However, observe
the manner in which the State's attorney chose to examine the
panel on this issue in the case of State v. Pinkston:B
If you were accepted as a juror in this case, and found de-
fendant was guilty without a reasonable doubt, if you believe
from the evidence that the death penalty was proper, would
you vote for it? 9
The trial court unhesitatingly rejected the inquiry, and on ap-
peal, the Missouri Supreme Court refused to reverse the ruling,
adhering strictly to the principle that:
An attorney should not, in advance, ask a juror to speculate
hypothetical in form. The juror is asked if he would pre-judge the credi-bility of this friendly witness, which question refers to the present state of
mind of the juror. However, by asking the juror whether he will give the
same credibility to testimony of strangers as to that of friends, counsel is
requiring the juror to decide the question of credibility which is to arise
in the future, during the course of the trial.
Thus, the question suggested by the court would be: "Mr. Juror, do you
now believe that the witness with whom you are friendly will be truthful?"
To answer the question, the juror needs only to examine the present state
of his own mind. He need not speculate as to how he might later decide the
relative credibility of friendly and strange witnesses.37. See also Mattney v. State, 231 Ala. 70, 163 So. 656 (1935), where
defendant was prosecuted for unlawful possession of liquor. Counsel fordefendant brazenly asked the jurors whether they would feel bound by the
testimony of the State's only expert witness, one Hibbitt. The court pro-hibited the interrogation, citing it as a flagrant example of attempting to
commit a juror to a certain conclusion before the testimony had been heard;
accord: Jenkins v. State, 31 Fla. 196, 12 So. 677 (1893).
The rule is actually not entirely unaminous, although it may be so con-
sidered for all practical purposes. For example, People v. Car Soy, 57 Cal.102 (1880) has never been overruled, although it held that jurors may be
asked whether they would "take the word" of a Chinaman to be as reliable
as that of a white man.
38. 336 Mo. 614, 79 S. W. 2d 1046 (1935).
39. Id. at 618, 79 S. W. 2d at 1048.
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upon what he would do, and how his verdict might be influ-
enced by certain contingencies that may later arise in the
trial.4 0
On some occasions it may be exceedingly difficult to recognize
hypothetical questions and distinguish them from legitimate
inquiries. For example, the two cases of State v. Henry4' may
appropriately be considered. These cases involved a first degree
murder prosecution in which a conviction upon the first trial was
reversed by the appellate court, and a new trial granted, at which
another conviction was obtained. Upon the voir dire examina-
tion at the initial trial defendant's counsel interrogated the jury
thus:
If defendant is proven guilty, could you also vote for a
verdict of guilty without capital punishment, but imprison-
ment for life?
This question was permitted by the judge with acquiescence by
the upper court on appeal. But at the second trial, the state's
attorney attempted a similar examination, asking each juror:
If you find defendant not entitled to a qualified verdict or
mercy, would you vote for the death penalty?
This inquiry was excluded by the trial court, and the ruling
affirmed on appeal. The Louisiana Supreme Court pointed out
that hypothetical questions are not competent when their evident
purpose is to cause jurors to commit thmeselves to certain ideas
or views concerning the decisions they are ultimately to make.
However, the court clearly distinguishes the questioning allowed
at the first trial, since that inquiry was made merely to discover
whether a juror could conceive of any other punishment besides
the death penalty. There was no attempt to commit the jurors
in advance. Evidently the court based the entire distinction on
the substitution of the word "would" for "could," the former
being a word which tends definitely to cause the juror to specu-
late as to his future verdict. Use of the word "could," on the
other hand, inquires of the juror merely whether he is conscien-
tiously capable of arriving at a certain verdict. Perhaps this may
be regarded as an undue exercise of semantics by the court, but
it nevertheless illustrates how rigidly a court may enforce the
rule against hypothetical questions even though the information
sought is for a legitimate purpose.42
40. Ibid.
41. 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940), and 197 La. 199, 3 So. 2d 104 (1941).
42. The underlying reason for the court's apparent inconsistency in
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The limitation involved herein is thus one of virtually uni-
versal application. To the careful and precise practitioner, it will
prove of little detriment; its prohibitions are easily circumvented
by well-planned and carefully framed questions.
EXAMINATION OF JURORS WITH RESPECT TO THE
LAW INVOLVED IN THE CASE
Probably the most controversial question in regard to limita-
tions upon voir dire examinations is the permissibility of inter-
rogating jurors as to their cognizance and approval of the law
involved in the case to be heard by them. Typical of the ques-
tions in this category is the familiar inquiry usually attempted
by defendant's counsels:
You understand, don't you, that in order to bring in a ver-
dict of "guilty" against defendant you must be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt; a mere preponder-
ance of evidence in the prosecution's favor is insufficient.
In the United States today, there is confusion generally as to the
propriety of such interrogations. In fact, the highest courts of
several states have approved bothb viewpoints, holding that
neither allowing nor excluding such inquiries is such an abuse
of discretion as to warrant reversal. 43 Jurisdictions which ex-
clude such questions generally do so to prevent an invasion of
the exclusive province of the court of instructing the jury as to
the law,44 while other courts advance the reasoning that to permit
such interrogations would lead to interminable, time-consuming
voir dire explanations.- However, jurisdictions allowing such
inquiries will usually impose some limitation, as shall subse-
quently be considered.
The first analysis here to be made will be of the justification
for the prohibition of questions concerning the law; the contrary
viewpoint will later be discussed. Referring again to the twofold
ultimate purpose of voir dire examinations, i. e., to discover bases
for causal challenges and to gain knowledge to enable an intelli-
gent exercise of peremptory challenges, it would appear that
these two cases may be that the question allowed in the first trial was
submitted by defendant's counsel, while at the second trial it was the prose-
cution's examination which was limited. Courts are apt to be more lenient
when a defendant is examining than when the inquiry is by the State.
43. State v. Turley, 87 Vt. 163, 88 At]. 562 (1912).
44. People v. Conklin, 175 N. Y. 333, 67 N. E. 624 (1903).
45. State v. Douthitt, 26 N. M. 532, 194 Pac. 879 (1921).
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inquiries involving the law are improper components of voir dire.
Such questions serve neither purpose: they do not give rise to
challenge for cause,46 nor do they provide counsel with informa-
tion of a juror's background which might provide a foundation
for a peremptory challenge. The sole motivation for such inter-
rogations is generally counsel's desire to impress upon the jury
that portion of the law which is favorable to his client.47
Many courts prohibit voir dire interrogations involving the
law as a practical matter; the chief fear seems to be that exami-
nations of jury panels would become too time-consuming once
the door was opened to such questions. This doctrine was effec-
tively enunciated in State v. Bauer,48 where defendant, charged
with rape, sought to explain by appropriate questioning the
basic law involving burden of proof and presumption of inno-
cence. The highest court of Minnesota sustained the exclusion
of such questions, emphatically declaring:
... if the defendant has a legal right to examine, as a matter
of law, prospective jurors, first instructing them as to the
law and then exacting a promise to apply such law favorable
to the defendant, then there is no limit to which he may not
go. He may explain and exact a promise in reference to the
law of circumstantial evidence, confessions, corroborating
testimony, accomplices, credibility of witnesses, and numer-
ous other matters which he thinks are favorable to his case. 49
However, in view of the great discretion exercisable by a trial
court in limiting voir dire examinations, the reasoning advanced
in the Bauer case seems rather shallow. No great perplexity
would arise if the court allowed counsel to extend his examina-
tion to the very general propositions of law, but then imposed
limitations whenever counsel sought to formulate those indecor-
ous questions pertaining to finer points of law which would tend
unduly to prolong the examination. Thus, the alleged intermina-
bility of such examinations seems a poor justification for pro-
hibiting voir dire inquiries involving general principles of law.
46. A juror is not incompetent because of his ignorance of the law.
People v. Conklin, 175 N. Y. 333, 67 N. E. 624 (1903); State v. Dreher, 166
La. 924, 118 So. 85 (1928).
47. Nor can this type of examination be justified as a means of dis-
covering whether jurors will follow certain laws involved, for all jurors are
under a rigid oath to follow the law as instructed by the court.
48. 189 Minn. 280, 249 N. W. 40 (1933).
49. Id. at 282, 249 N. W. at 41. Virtually identical reasoning was em-
ployed in State v. Douthitt, 26 N. M. 532, 194 Pac. 879 (1921).
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A far more potent reason, however, for excluding such ques-
tioning is that it constitutes an invasion of the court's exclusive
province of instructing juries as to the law. The basic operative
principle of the jury system is that questions of fact are to be
decided by the jury, the court retaining the power to determine
the applicable doctrines of law and to instruct the jury as to how
the latter should be applied to the former in order to obtain a
just and proper verdict. To allow counsel to advise and examine
the jury on the various legal propositions involved would consti-
tute a usurpation of this exclusive province" of the court. So, in
State v. Ford,50 where defendant, in a prosecution for armed
robbery, attempted to interrogate the jury panel as to the dis-
tinction between robbery and assault, the Missouri Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's ruling excluding such examina-
tion, stating that:
Counsel may not implant in the jury's minds the idea that
they should independently draw legal distinctions. They
must be guided by the court's instructions on such ques-
tions.51
This reasoning seems irreproachable. The jury is sworn to
adhere to the law as expressed and defined by the court, hence
counsel's consideration of the law on the voir dire examination
is patently inappropriate.52
Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of American courts still
permit the voir dire examination to touch upon general principles
of law involved in the case. A leading case supporting this propo-
sition is People v. Bennett," in which the court held that in-
quiries as to whether jurors will follow certain legal propositions
are pertinent to assure a just trial. Defendant there was charged
with ilurder, and his counsel attempted to ascertain upon voir
dire examination whether the jurors understood and would follow
the rules of law in regard to burden of proof, presumption of
innocence, and self-defense. Although the trial court excluded
such questions as invading the province of the court, the appel-
late tribunal reversed this ruling as an abuse of discretion, stat-
ing:
50. 346 M o. 882, 143 S. W. 2d 289 (1940).
51. Id. at 884, 143 S. W. 2d at 290.
52. State v. Ford, 346 Mo. 882, 143 S. W. 2d 289 (1940) ; Ryan v. State,
115 Wis. 488, 92 N. W. 271 (1902).
53. 79 CaL App. 76, 249 Pac. 20 (1926).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/4
NOTES
That the matter of instructing a jury upon the law by the
court, and the question whether the jury will follow the law
as it is thus submitted to them are, when considered with
respect to the exercise of the right of a party to probe a
juror's mind to ascertain and determine whether he can and
will try the case fairly and impartially, two entirely differ-
ent and distinct considerations, is a self-evident proposi-
tion.14
The court thus considered an interrogation as to whether a juror
would follow a certain law completely distinguishable from an
instruction as to what that law is. However, the court appar-
ently overlooked the fact that, in order to inquire into the juror's
willingness to follow the law, it is first necessary for counsel to
state the law completely, just as the court might state it in an
ensuing instruction. Is not this then a usurpation of the power
of the court, since counsel is performing the identical task which
shall subsequently befall the court? Furthermore, does it not
seem futile to ask each juror whether he will follow such laws
if so instructed by the court, since the entire jury is committed
by oath to adhere to instructions given from the bench? It is
suggested that the true reason for allowing such interrogations
is not to ascertain whether jurors will follow the law, but to
enable counsel vividly to implant in the juror's minds those basic
and fundamental principles that underlie a criminal trial, of
which the jurors should never lose sight.
The Bennett case, however, is not authority for the general
sanction of voir dire examinations on questions of law. The
court, in fact, strictly observed that exploratory interrogations
on various principles of law should not be allowed. But, it was
pointed out, the basic principles of law, such as burden of proof,
whether or not a given juror understands and will follow such
propositions, constitute matters of pertinent inquiry in ascertain-
ing whether said juror is legally qualified to hear the case. In
this respect the Bennett case is illustrative of the usual practice
in jurisdictions which allow interrogations pertaining to the law.
While such courts will permit an examination concerning the
general, basic legal propositions involved in the case, they will
invariably refuse to permit counsel to conduct an exhaustive in-
quiry on every principle of law applicable to such case.55
54. Id. at 89, 249 Pac. at 25.
55. For question of law usually permitted in framing voir dire inter-
rogations, see People v. Kestian, 335 Ill. 596, 167 N. E. 786 (1929).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Thus, while there is direct conflict on the permissibility of
certain interrogations concerning the law, virtually all jurisdic-
tions agree that no voir dire examination should embrace all the
detailed legal questions likely to be involved. Reasonable inquir-
ies on the basic principles of law involved in the case seem hardly
objectionable so long as the court does not feel that counsel is
invading its sole and exclusive province of instructing as to the
law.
SUMMARY
The problem of limiting voir dire examinations, it may be
concluded, is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial
court. A liberal exercise of that discretion is virtually mandatory
if the criminal defendant is to benefit from the privilege of ex-
ercising his peremptory challenges, for without adequate means
of obtaining information, there can be no intelligent basis for
striking jurors from the panel.
In general, courts have formulated definite policies in regard
to examinations on such questions as group or religious affilia-
tions or prejudices, hypothetical questions to elicit jurors' opin-
ions, and inquiries concerning the law of the case. Only as to
the second category, hypothetical questions, have the courts de-
veloped what may be called a general prohibition, but that in-
junction may easily be circumvented by the careful wording of
each question. Examinations seeking to uncover prejudices
against certain groups are now seldom limited, but the conflict
as to the permissibility of inquiries pertaining to law has as yet
not been resolved. In all events, it is urged that voir dire exami-
nations be given a maximum latitude in criminal prosecutions.
Then, and then only, will the fullest possible benefit of a trial by
jury be given to the defendant.
MERLE SILVERSTEIN
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